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THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE
OF EQUAL PROTECTION
KENNETH L. KASTt
Given today's prominence of the equal protection clause as a lim-
itation on the states, the Constitution's omission of any explicit parallel
guarantee against the federal government seems anomalous. To the
framers of the fourteenth amendment, however, no such anomaly
would have been apparent. Above all, they sought to empower Con-
gress to impose national guarantees of racial equality on the states;1
it would not have been obvious to them that Congress itself should be
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
I am grateful for this chance to join the North Carolina Law Review in honoring
Frank Strong. Even if I had never met Frank, I should want to pay tribute to his
contributions to constitutional law scholarship. There are only a tiny handful of schol-
ars who can be classed as Frank's peers when it comes to the analysis of the institu-
tional/structural side of constitutional law: the interrelations among courts, adminis-
trative agencies and legislatures. During recent years, when the vogue in writing on
constitutional law has often been elsewhere, Frank has continued to focus on Lhese
fundamental issues, bringing to them an especially keen sense of the uses of history
in sorting out the components of live problems. His casebook, American Constitu-
tional Law (1950) was, and remains, an advanced text on constitutional theory; I keep
it handy, and refer to it regularly, and always with profit.
This sophistication is not the first thing one notices upon meeting Frank Strong.
He is a big and hearty man, and his manner suggests little of the complexity of
thought that lies beneath that surface. The warmth, of course, is genuine; if any
one word captures Frank, it is "genuine." There is no pretense about the man, and
no pretension, either. You don't have to guess about what he thinks, or who he is;
he will tell you, in plain language. (Well, sometimes not so plain. In conversation,
he can construct sentences that are breathtakingly complex. At the end, though, the
subject connects to the verb, and every clause in between has all its buttons. I said
he was keen on structure.)
The main reason I feel honored to join this tribute is yet to be stated. Frank was
the Dean when I joined the Ohio State law faculty as its youngest member, and the
generosity that he and Gertrude showed to me and my family is something we shall
always remember. It was characteristic of Frank that he assigned me to teach the
course he had been teaching for a generation. (At alumni gatherings, I became acutely
aware of the size of the shoes I was trying to fill.) It is, finally, his humanity that
makes the man what he is. I know a lot of people who talk about brotherhood, but
very few who really assume that everyone is part of their family. Frank is one of
those. As one who has drawn nourishment of the mind and spirit from him, I want
to say thanks as I join this salute.
1. See C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888, at pt. 1, ch. XX
(1971) (vol. VI of HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, P. Freund,
gen. ed.); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1955).
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limited by a constitutional guarantee of equal protection.2 Only in the
mid-twentieth century, when the equal protection clause was emerging
as a significant self-executing limitation on the states, did the anomaly
appear. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court found a way to remedy
the textual omission, concluding that the fifth amendment's due process
clause prohibited arbitrary discrimination by the federal government.
It was fitting that this act of statecraft3 was performed in the course
of invalidating racial segregation in the public schools of the District
of Columbia. The case, of course, was Bolling v. Sharpe,4 and the year
was 1954.
In the two decades since that decision, the Court has extended
the fifth amendment's guarantee of equal protection well beyond its
initial application to federally sponsored racial discrimination. The
process of doctrinal extension had gone so far that the Court could say,
two years ago: "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal pro-
tection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."5 Except for the hyperbole
in the word "always," that statement was, in 1975, a fair summary of
Supreme Court doctrine. The very next year, however, saw an impor-
tant qualification, announced by the Court in the context of the treat-
ment of aliens by the federal government:
Although [the Fifth and Fourteenth] Amendments require the same
type of analysis, . . . the two protections are not always coexten-
sive. Not only does the language of the two Amendments differ,
but more importantly, there may be overriding national interests
which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable
for an individual State.6
The apparent tension between these two recent pronouncements
prompts this article's exploration of the current state of fifth amend-
ment equal protection doctrine. We begin at the historical and analyt-
ical beginnings.
I. ORIGINS AND SOURCES
The doctrine of fifth amendment equal protection entered the
2. The fifteenth amendment, however, prohibits both the United States and the
states from denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race.
3. I do not use the word pejoratively, as did Hans Linde in his criticism of the
opinion in this case. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227,
232-34 (1972).
4. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
5. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
6. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (footnote omitted).
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Constitution a little at a time, in a series of decisions that gradually
came to acknowledge its existence even while refusing to apply it.
The camel, in other words, backed into the tent. If there is irony here,
it is irony of a familiar kind; some of the most significant doctrinal de-
velopments of the twentieth century proceeded in exactly the same
way. Thus the fourteenth amendment's protection of the freedom of
speech against the states was born in a decision that sent the speaker
to prison, 7 and the "suspect" nature of racial classifications was an-
nounced in an opinion upholding harsh wartime restrictions on some
100,000 persons of Japanese descent.' The decision in Boiling v.
Sharpe, in any event, did not so much create the doctrine of fifth
amendment equal protection as ratify it.
As recently as the 1920s, the Supreme Court tossed off equal pro-
tection claims against the federal government as if they were frivolous.
When a taxpayer attacked the World War I excess profits tax law for
its "baseless and arbitrary discriminations," claiming a violation of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment, the Court answered with
little more than a shrug: "Reference is made to cases decided under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ; but
clearly they are not in point. The Fifth Amendment has no equal pro-
tection clause, and the only rule of uniformity [for federal taxes] is
the territorial uniformity required by Art. I, § 8." 9 Thus at the zenith
of judicial intervention to protect property and enterprise in the name
of substantive due process-and, less frequently, in the name of equal
protection-the idea of guaranteeing equality against federal invasion
lay dormant.'"
Yet even as that Sleeping Beauty, substantive due process, was
7. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
9. La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 368, 392 (1921) (citations
omitted). Later in the same year, however, the Court decided Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921). In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Taft recognized that to the
extent due process sets a "minimum of protection for every one's right of life, liberty and
property," it "tends to secure equality of law." He added, "Our whole system of law is
predicated on the general, fundamental principle of equality of application of the law."
257 U.S. at 332. This statement was not an endorsement of a principle that due process
includes a guarantee of equal protection, but it does suggest that Taft was aware of some
overlap of the functions of due process and equal protection. The idea that the fifth
amendment might contain an equal protection guarantee was not unknown during this
time. See, e.g., United States v. Yount, 267 F. 861, 863 (W.D. Pa. 1920).
10. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, was pressed into
service in a case involving racial discrimination. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917).
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being laid to rest," the Court hinted in a series of dicta that the fifth
amendment might, after all, prohibit arbitrary federal discrimination.
The ritual recital in all these opinions was that "the Fifth [Amen-
ment] contains no equal protection clause" 2 -as if the point might
otherwise escape even careful readers. But the Court would go on,
saying that it assumed for argument that federal discrimination, if com-
pletely unjustified, might violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. At the same time, the Court continued to assure us, the
legislation before it did no such thing."
The critical opinion in this series was written by Chief Justice
Stone in Hirabayashi v. United States,' 4 a case of tragic irony. Persons
of Japanese ancestry were required by military order to obey a curfew
in West Coast areas during the early months of World War II. When
an American citizen of Japanese parentage violated the curfew, he was
prosecuted and convicted; the Court upheld his conviction, on the basis
of what it perceived to be a wartime emergency. The decision richly
deserves Eugene Rostow's characterization of it as a disaster.la But
the opinion pointed the way to the adoption by the Court of the doc-
trine of fifth amendment equal protection. As this passage shows,
Chief Justice Stone began where the Court had always begun; however,
the Court's previous "No" had turned to "No, but . . . ": "The Fifth
Amendment contains no equal protection clause and it restrains only
such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of
due process. . . . Congress may hit at a particular danger where it
is seen, without providing for others which are not so evident or so ur-
11. The doctrine slumbered for 28 years before being awakened by the kiss of
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. E.g., Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943).
13. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Currin v. Wallace, 306
U.S. 1, 13-14 (1939); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937); cf. United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In Carolene Products the Court
upheld a federal law prohibiting the interstate shipment of "filled milk" (skimmed milk
compounded with fat other than milk fat). The statute was attacked on a number of
grounds, including an equal protection ground based on its failure to cover oleomargarine
or other dairy substitutes. The Court rejected this argument, saying:
The Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause, and even that of the
Fourteenth, applicable only to the states, does not compel their legislatures to
prohibit all like evils, or none. A legislature may hit at an abuse which it has
found, even though it has failed to strike at another.
304 U.S. at 151. Four fourteenth amendment cases were cited. Neither the citations
nor the comment about states' power were necessary if the Court meant to hold strictly
to the view that the fifth amendment offered no protection whatever against federal
discrimination.
14. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
15. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
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gent." 16 Here the Chief Justice cited a 1914 opinion by Justice Holmes,
upholding a state law against a fourteenth amendment equal protection
attack.1" The citation was relevant only if there was something to be
learned from the fourteenth amendment in determining what sort of
discrimination by Congress might amount to a denial of due process
under the fifth amendment.'
The Hirabayashi opinion went on to remark that discriminations
based on ancestry are "odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality." 9 For this proposition, the
Chief Justice cited three previous decisions, two state discrimination
cases arising under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 20 and one case decided under the Philippine Bill of
Rights. 21  Concluding the fifth amendment discussion, he said, "We
may assume that these considerations would be controlling here were
it not for [the war emergency]. ' '22 A similar assumption seems to
have made a year later in Korematsu v. United States,23 when a narrow
majority of the Court upheld an order excluding persons of Japanese
descent from the West Coast. Only the dissenters sought to identify
the constitutional provision that was in play. Justice Jackson merely
referred to "the due process clause," 24 but for Justice Murphy, the ex-
clusion order was a deprivation "of the equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 26
The slate was thus far from blank when Chief Justice Warren
wrote for a unanimous Court in Boling v. Sharpe. Drawing on the
Court's repeated assumption-always stated in dicta and "for argu-
ment"--that the fifth amendment prohibits arbitrary federal discrimi-
nation, the Chief Justice announced that "discrimination may be so un-
16. 320 U.S. at 100 (citations omitted).
17. Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914).
18. Chief Justice (then Associate Justice) Stone was, of course, also the author of
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), discussed in note 13 supra.
19. 320 U.S. at 100.
20. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
21. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926).
22. 320 U.S. at 100.
23. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24. Id. at 245.
25. Id. at 234-35. See also United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
The Court passed up an opportunity to reach the issue of fifth amendment equal
protection in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), the companion case to Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Hurd arose in the District of Columbia. Instead of
holding that a federal court injunction enforcing a racially restrictive covenant violated
the fifth amendment, the Court held that such an injunction violated (a) the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, and (b) "the public policy of the United States." 334 U.S. at 35.
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justifiable as to be violative of due process. '20  Drawing on dicta in
Hirabayashi and Korematsu, he stated that racial classifications were sus-
pect, demanding careful judicial scrutiny. And, since school segrega-
tion was "not reasonably related to any proper governmental objec-
tive, '2 7 he concluded that it deprived the segregated black children of
their liberty in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.
The Bolling opinion appealed chiefly to precedent. And the
precedent on which the Court relied was anything but rock-solid, as
this sketch has shown.28  As if recognizing this weakness, the Chief
Justice closed his discussion of fifth amendment equal protection with
a co.lnient that looked in another direction: "In view of our decision
that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Con-
stitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.
-20
Once the textual omission of an equal protection clause in the fifth
amendment was seen as a serious anomaly, then, the Court supplied
its interpretive remedy. But its failure to bolster a rather assertive
short opinion with argument addressed to "the text, the history, or the
political structure of the Constitution"3 lay the Court open to the
charge that what it found "unthinkable" was the political implication
of a contrary decision, rather than an anomaly of constitutional princi-
ple." At this distance, we cannot know what the Court had in its col-
lective mind when it decided Bolling v. Sharpe, or what Chief Justice
Warren had in mind when he wrote the opinion. What we can see
in the perspective of two decades, however, is that the decision, and
26. 347 U.S. at 499. The opinion also cited Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917). Id.
27. 347 U.S. at 500.
28. One particularly shaky appeal to precedent was the Court's quotation from
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896). In that opinion, the first Justice Harlan
said that the Constitution forbade, "so far as civil and political rights are concerned,
discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen because
of his race." Id. at 591. This pious statement (dictum as to the federal government,
since the case involved a fourteenth amendment claim against a state) must have seemed
hollow to Gibson, a black man accused of murdering a white. The Court denied
removal under the existing civil rights removal statute, despite the showing that: about
7000 blacks and 1500 whites were eligible for jury service in the county; of the 200
names on the list of those selected for the jury panel, all were white; and for several
years no black had served on the grand jury. The irony in drawing the Bollitg result
from Gibson thus surpasses even the irony in relying on Hirabayashi.
29. 347 U.S. at 500 (footnote omitted).
30. Linde, supra note 3, at 233-34.
31. Id. Professor Linde does not argue that Boiling was wrongly decided.
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the principle of fifth amendment equal protection on which it rests, are
amply justified by text, by structure and by history.
It has been obvious ever since the fourteenth amendment became
law that its guarantees of due process and equal protection overlap in
a large number of cases. Justice Bradley explained the point in his
dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases,32 and modern commentators
have refined the analysis. 3  Thus, to the degree that a statute is (in
equal protection language) "overinclusive," it also invites a due process
attack, since it restricts liberty without justification. 34  And the case
that Tussman and tenBroek chose to illustrate their concept of "sub-
stantive equal protection" was Hirabayashi,5 a fifth amendment due
process decision. 36 A number of decisions before Bolling v. Sharpe
invalidated state laws on equal protection grounds, when due process
would have served just as well;17 similarly, some pre-Bolling due pro-
cess decisions now seem to have been equal protection decisions in dis-
guise.38
This intermixture of claims to liberty and equality has ancient
roots. Aristotle, in a famous passage, said:
The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to
the common opinion of men, can be enjoyed only in such a state;
... .Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and therefore in
a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because
there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme.
This, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be
the principle of their state.39
And Magna Carta itself, which the framers of the fifth amendment
surely thought to be the ancestor of the due process clause, has also
32. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 112-21 (1873).
33. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341, 351-52 (1949).
34. The first amendment overbreadth doctrine typifies the due process approach to
"overinclusive" statutes. Justice Douglas, concurring in the first amendment decision in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 218 (1975), even referred to the
ordinance in question as "fatally overinclusive in some respects and fatally underinclusive
in others."
35. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
36. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 33, at 361-63.
37. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915).
38. E.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). For a modern illustration of
this overlap, see the debate between Justices Harlan and Douglas in Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), over the question whether due process or equal protection was
the appropriate ground to justify a result they both agreed was proper.
39. This passage from Jowett's translation of the Politics is reprinted in F. COKER,
READINGS IN PoLrricAL PnLosoPim 87 (rev. ed. 1938).
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been received into the American legal tradition as a guarantee of equal
protection. 0 The "law of the land," with which due process was as-
sumed to be synonymous,"' was a legacy of the common law, with em-
phasis on the word "common." Daniel Webster, following Blackstone,
said, "By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law.
• .. The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property, and immunities, under the protection of the general rules
which govern society. '4 2 If the civil rights movement has marched in
the name of "freedom," and the women's movement claims equality
in the name of "liberation," there is venerable precedent.
Webster's reference to "every citizen" also reminds us that the
very idea of citizenship implies some measure of equality. The prin-
ciple derives from the social contract theory that was so prominent in
the minds of the framers of the original Constitution. Rousseau's for-
mulation is explicit:
[Tihe social compact establishes among the citizens such an equal-
ity that they all pledge themselves under the same conditions and
ought all to enjoy the same rights. Thus, by the nature of the
compact, every act of sovereignty, that is, every authentic act of
the general will, binds or favors equally all the citizens ....
[T]he sovereign never has a right to burden one subject more than
another, because then the matter becomes particular and his power
is no longer competent.
43
One of the main purposes of the Constitution was to form a new social
contract among all the people of the nation. It was "We, the People
of the United States" who ordained and established the Constitution.44
40. See A. HowARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 307-15 (1968). On the line of
descent from Magna Carta to due process, see F. STRONG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 43-51 (1950).
41. See A. HOWARD, supra note 40, ch. XVI. Julius Goebel has argued that the
terms were not synonymous, but he does not dispute that the framers so regarded them.
See J. GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
168-72 (1946). See also J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 101
(1971) (vol. 1 of HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, P. Freund,
gen. ed.).
42. Quoted in A. HOWARD, supra note 40, at 308. See also Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101 (1877).
43. Compare J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. II, ch. IV (Tozer trans.
1902), reprinted in F. CORER, READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 646-47 (rev. ed. 1938),
with the modern contract theory of J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 504-12 (1971).
44. U.S. CONST. Preamble. Compare Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), in
which the Supreme Court held that the provision in art. I, § 2 that representatives in
Congress be chosen "by the People of the several States" requires equality in the
population of congressional districts. The actual degree of popular support for the
Constitution in 1787-1789 is a matter of some debate. See C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE
[Vol. 55
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From the beginning it was assumed that the new national government
would have a direct relationship with individuals. As Marshall said,
the national government is "emphatically and truly, a government of
the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its
powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them,
and for their benefit."4  This new direct relationship gave the national
government both powers and responsibilities.40 Hamilton, defending
the Constitution against the criticism that it lacked a Bill of Rights,
quoted the Preamble's statement that the Constitution was ordained
and established by "the People," and added: "Here is a better recog-
nition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make
the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights . . .
There were, to be sure, some who questioned whether the people
were citizens of the United States as well as citizens of the states, 48 but
the prevailing view, certainly by Webster's time, held that they were
both.4 9  The Supreme Court's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford5  is
scorned today, and properly so, for the racist assumptions that produced
its racist conclusions. But Chief Justice Taney uttered no heresy when
he said, "The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing . . . . They are what we
familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty." 51 It is quite
proper, then, to read the original Constitution as conferring national
citizenship on the people-with the exception of the ugly blemish of
slavery. And, as Charles Black has eloquently argued, national citizen-
ship implies some substantial measure of equality among the nation's
citizens. 2
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835, at 65-78, 562
(1944).
45. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
46. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison, 1788) for a discussion of those
features of the new Constitution that were "national," as opposed to "federal." Cf.
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867) ("But if the government has these
rights on her own account [to demand services, etc. of its citizens], the citizen also has
correlative rights."). See also E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 80 (1955), on "the rights of Americans."
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 534 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
48. The chief questioners were the nullificationists. See the discussion of Justice
Field, dissenting in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 94 (1873).
49. See C. HAINES, supra note 44, at 562.
50. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
51. Id. at 404.
52. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51-61
(1969). Professor Black acknowledges his debt to the first Justice Harlan, dissenting in
1977]
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Consider again the words of Justice Bradley:
A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right
to go and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship
therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen; ....
He is not bound to cringe to any superior, or to pray for any act
of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and privileges en-
joyed by other citizens. . . If a man be denied full equality be-
fore the law, he is denied one of the essential rights of citizenship as
a citizen of the United States.5 3
That Bradley was speaking in dissent-and, indeed, in defense of a
theory of economic due process that has been out of vogue for four
decades--does not detract from the good sense of these passages of
his opinion. It also makes no difference to this thesis that Justice
Bradley was focusing on the fourteenth amendment. For, as he said,
even before that amendment was enacted, "the citizens of each of the
States and the citizens of the United States would be entitled to certain
privileges and immunities as citizens, at the hands of their own govern-
ment . . . 4
To say that the "liberty" protected by the due process clause im-
plied some measure of equal liberties, and that the same implication
follows from the idea of national citizenship, is not to say that the
framers of the fifth amendment envisioned anything resembling today's
use of the amendment's due process clause as a guarantee of equal pro-
tection.55 The point is merely that the original Constitution implied
some measure of equality among citizens, and that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment was an appropriate receptacle for that
concept. The measure of equality commanded by the principle of
equal citizenship has, of course, increased enormously-not because
the principle is a recent invention, but because our conception of what
it means to be a citizen has grown.
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883), and to Kinoy, The Constitutional Right
of Negro Freedom, 21 RuTGERs L. REv. 387 (1967). C. BLACK, supra, at 53.
53. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 112-13 (1873) (dissenting
opinion). Several provisions of the original Constitution reinforce the idea of equal
national citizenship, e.g., the prohibition against the granting of titles of nobility by the
United States, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; the prohibition against federal bills of
attainder, id. cl. 3; the requirement of geographical uniformity in federal taxation, id. §
8, cl. 1; and the prohibition against direct federal taxes that are not proportional to
population, id. § 9, cl. 4.
54. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 114. He added, "Equality before the law is undoubtedly
one of the privileges and immunities of every citizen." id. at 118.
55. The framers, of course, accepted inequalities of horrendous proportion, includ-
ing slavery and the limitation of the franchise to white male property owners.
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If, after the Civil War, there could be any lingering doubt that
we were all citizens of the United States, that doubt was removed by
the fourteenth amendment's explicit declaration20  But if that state-
ment were repealed tomorrow, the fact of national citizenship would
remain in the sense that we should continue to think of ourselves
primarily as citizens of the nation, and only secondarily as citizens of
the several states. We are all part of one economy; we are highly
mobile, both in capacity and in inclination; a national system of com-
munications hands us the same news and the same entertainment; we
look to the national government as the chief arena for the interplay of
political forces. It has long been obvious to us that these aspects of
our nationhood demand a generous view of the powers of the national
government.17  And as those expanded powers have been exercised,
we have come to perceive the obligations of citizenship as running
primarily to the national polity. 58 It would have been extraordinary
if this growth in the sense of national citizenship had not been accom-
panied by an expanded view of the rights of citizens against the national
government.o
Thus, while the principle of equal national citizenship finds its
justification in the origins and structure of the national government, it
is history that justifies the expansion of that principle's content-the
same history that justifies an expanded reading of the commerce clause
as a source of national power. The newer ingredient in this doctrinal
56. Section I of the amendment begins by saying: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." Justice Bradley, commenting on the
amendment's privileges and immunities clause, said: "It was not necessary to say in
words that the citizens of the United States should have and exercise all the privileges of
citizens . . . . Their very citizenship conferred these privileges, if they did not possess
them before." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 119. Bradley, of course, was of the view that
citizens did possess those privileges before the fourteenth amendment was adopted.
Justice Jackson, speaking of the privileges and immunities clause, said, "This clause
was adopted to make United States citizenship the dominant and paramount allegiance
among us." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (concurring opinion).
57. See Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946 (pts.
1 & 2), 59 HARV. L. REv. 645, 883 (1946).
58. E.g., military service, and the relative burdens of those taxes that most touch
our consciousness. Above all, loyalty runs primarily to the nation.
59. Charles Fairman, in speaking approvingly of Justice Bradley's view of national
citizenship, has captured the point:
The conception is not static. As the nation experiences change-in its trans-
portation, commerce and industry-in its political practices-in the way in
which people live and work and move about-in the expectations they enter-
tain about the quality of American life-surely the privilege of membership
in this national community must broaden to include what has become essential
under prevailing circumstances.
C. FAIRMAN, supra note 1, at 1388.
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mix is the primacy of national citizenship. Recognition of this primacy
has led the Supreme Court to two conclusions that have given life to
the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment. First, it would
trivialize the principle of equal national citizenship to limit its use to
the correction of abuses by the states; the heart of the principle is that
citizens have a right to equal treatment by the national government.
Secondly, the primacy of national citizenship means that in the absence
of special concerns about the place of the Congress and the President
in the structure of government, the fifth amendment's guarantee of
equal protection must be no less protective than the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Bolling v. Sharpe, of course, presented no special considerations
of a structural kind that would justify departure from the basic rule of
congruence of fifth and fourteenth amendment equal protection. In-
deed, racial discrimination was the foremost target of the fourteenth
amendment's reaffirmation of the principle of national citizenship.
Chief Justice Warren committed no extravagance when he said that any
other result in the case would be unthinkable.
II. THE BASIC RULE OF CONGRUENCE
The Supreme Court's most recent effort to spell out the relation
between the fifth amendment's guarantee of equal protection and the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause was made last year in
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.60 Five aliens were denied federal jobs
because a rule of the Civil Service Commission barred aliens from em-
ployment in the federal civil service. Their challenge to this rule suc-
ceeded in the Supreme Court o. a narrow ground,0 1 but the Court
hinted broadly that it would have upheld a congressional statute limit-
ing eligibility for the federal service to citizens. 62 Since the Court had
previously struck down a state law denying all aliens employment in
60. 426U.S. 88 (1976).
61. The Court held that, since the rule would violate the equal protection clause if
adopted by a state, due process required "that there be a legitimate basis for presuming
that the rule was actually intended to serve" the "overriding national interest" that
arguably justified the rule. Id. at 103. Since the rule had not been expressly adopted by
the President or Congress, and since the Civil Service Commission had not stated
reasons identifying the national interest which it sought to promote, the Court held that
due process had been violated.
62. While two Justices who joined the opinion of the Court noted that they would
reserve this question for later decision, id. at 117, the other three Justices of the majority
would surely be joined on this issue by the four dissenters.
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the state civil service,6 3 its suggestion in Hampton called for explana-
tion.
The Court began by reinforcing the general principle of fifth
amendment equal protection: "The federal sovereign, like the States,
must govern impartially." 64 But, said the Court in a passage quoted
earlier, 5 "overriding national interests" may justify federal legislation
that would be forbidden to a state. "On the other hand," said the
Court,
when a federal rule is applicable to only a limited territory, such
as the District of Columbia, or an insular possession, and when
there is no special national interest involved, the Due Process
Clause [of the fifth amendment] has been construed as having the
same significance as the Equal Protection Clause.
In this case we deal with a federal rule having nationwide
impact.6
Thus a "simple extension" of the holding in the state-civil-service de-
cision was inappropriate, since "overriding national interests may pro-
vide a justification for a citizenship requirement in the federal service
"6S7
There are three separate references in this passage to "special"
or "overriding" interests of the national government that might justify
classifications in federal law that would be forbidden to the states.
Those references are a crucial qualification to the other distinction sug-
gested by the Court, between federal legislation for a limited territory
and federal legislation with "nationwide impact." In other words,
Boiling v. Sharpe---despite the Court's citation of it to illustrate fifth
amendment limits on legislation in the first category-cannot be con-
tained within the borders of the District of Columbia. The whole
course of the Court's fifth amendment equal protection decisions points
to a basic rule of congruence with the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause, modified only when "overriding national interests"
justify departure from the rule.
The texts of the two amendments differ, as the Court remarked
in Hampton; the fourteenth amendment does, indeed, contain both a
due process clause and an equal protection clause.6 But it does not
63. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
64. 426 U.S. at 100.
65. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
66. 426 U.S. at 100 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 101.
68. In a footnote, the Court said: "Since the Due Process Clause appears in both
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follow from this difference that the main function of the equal pro-
tection clause "differs from, and is additive to" 9 that of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. If the latter clause is an appropriate
vessel for the principle of equal national citizenship, as I have argued,70
then it necessarily performs a function in limiting the national govern-
ment that is similar to the function of the equal protection clause in
limiting the states.7 ' To speak of "the Due Process Clause" as if it
were the same in both amendments 72 is to miss this critical point-or
perhaps to assume that the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
worked a partial repeal of the fifth amendment, removing much of its
function as a guarantee of the rights of equal national citizenship. An
interpretation that makes more sense, and one that has been persuasive
to observers from Justice Bradley73 to Tussman and tenBroek,7 4 is that
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment are not logically separate, but are overlapping guarantees, both
designed to reinforce the amendment's confirmation of national citizen-
ship. At the very least, the constitutional text does not foreclose the
conclusion that the equal protection guarantees of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments are fundamentally congruent.
When we turn to the opinions of the Supreme Court, we find that
they uniformly point to the basic rule of congruence. In case after
case, fifth amendment equal protection problems are discussed on the
assumption that fourteenth amendment precedents are controlling. A
recent example is Washington v. Davis,7" decided just six days after
Hampton. The case presented the question whether a federal law that
has a racially discriminatory impact is, for that reason, a denial of equal
protection. Since the case arose in the District of Columbia, it can be
fitted into the Hampton opinion's suggested distinction between federal
legislation governing a limited area and laws of "nationwide impact."' 70
But the opinion shows no evidence that this distinction was ever con-
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, whereas the Equal Protection Clause does not, it
is quite clear that the primary office of the latter differs from, and is additive to, the
protection guaranteed by the former." Id. at 100 n.17.
69. Id.
70. See text accompanying notes 32-55 supra.
71. Obviously, the clause also performs functions parallel to those of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.
72. See note 68 supra.
73. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
75. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
76. See text accompanying note 66 supra; cf. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects
& Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 96 S. Ct. 2264 (1976). In this case, decided 16 days
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sidered. Instead, after noting that the fifth amendment's due process
clause "contains an equal protection component prohibiting the United
States from invidiously discriminating between individuals and groups,"
the Court stated the question as whether "a law or other official act
• . .is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact.""
The decisions on sex discrimination and on illegitimacy illustrate
the Court's consistent practice of treating the fifth and fourteenth
amendments' guarantees of equal protection as interchangeable, even
when the challenged federal law has "nationwide impact." In Frontiero
v. Richardson,78 where the issue was the validity of a federal statute
defining a military "dependent" in sex-discriminatory terms, eight
Justices agreed that the controlling precedent was Reed v. Reed7
9
a fourteenth amendment equal protection decision.?' And in Jime-
nez v. Weinberger"' and Mathews v. Lucas,"2 both involving equal
protection attacts on discrimination against illegitimates in the Social
Security program, majority and dissenting opinions alike treated four-
teenth amendment equal protection decisions 3 as authoritative, along
with fifth amendment decisions. The discussion of opinions following
this pattern could be prolonged, but I shall spare the reader by relegat-
after Hampton, the Court held invalid a Puerto Rican statute permitting only United
States citizens to practice privately as civil engineers. The Court held the law invalid on
equal protection grounds, expressly refusing to specify whether it was the fifth or the
fourteenth amendment that provided the protection. Id. at 2281. The Court said that
the law would violate either guarantee, but did not refer to Hampton's distinction
between federal statutes with merely local or nationwide impact. Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting, cited Hampton and chided the Court for failing to be more precise. Id. at
2285. The Examining Board case and Washington v. Davis show, at the least, that
Hampton's suggestion of a local-nationwide distinction is not in the forefront of the
Court's equal protection consciousness.
77. 426 U.S. at 239. Almost all the cases discussed by the Court in this section of
its opinion are fourteenth amendment equal protection decisions.
78. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
79. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
80. Other fifth amendment equal protection opinions following the same pattern in
the sex discrimination area are Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), a fourteenth amendment opinion on an issue of sex discrimination, cites
Frontiero with approval. Id. at 496 n.20. For a district court's view of the congruence
of fifth amendment and fourteenth amendment equal protection in the sex discrimination
area, see the carefully reasoned opinion in Lewis v. Cohen, 417 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (decided before Hampton).
81. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
82. 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976).
83. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (cited in both limenez
and Mathews); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (cited by Mathews majority);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (cited by Mathews majority).
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ing them to footnote status."'
There is a striking stylistic uniformity in these opinions. In the
text, they tend to refer generally to "equal protection" or to speak of
the "equal protection component" of the fifth amendment;s' most of
them speak to the relation between the fifth and fourteenth amendment
equal protection guarantees in footnotes, and it is remarkable how
often the same footnote appears: "While the Fifth Amendment con-
tains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' "0
Two quotations will suffice to close this review of recent opinions.
In Richardson v. Belcher,8 7 the Court upheld a provision of the Social
Security Act against a fifth amendment equal protection attack on its
classification of persons eligible for disability benefits. The principal
authority relied on by the Court was Dandridge v. Williams,8 a four-
teenth amendment equal protection decision. After citing Dandridge,
the Court said: "While the present case, involving as it does a federal
statute, does not directly implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, a classification that meets the test articulated in
Dandridge is perforce consistent with the due process requirement of
the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe ..... 89 Such a
conclusion, of course, would be entirely consistent with the view that
the fifth amendment's equal protection guarantee was less exten-
sive than that of the fourteenth amendment. But just a few years
later, in Johnson v. Robison, eight Justices joined in an opinion of
the Court rejecting a fifth amendment equal protection attack on a fed-
84. In addition to the cases discussed in text, see United States v. MacCollom, 96 S.
Ct. 2086 (1976); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
93 (1976) (per curiam); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974); United States
Dep't of Agr. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973). These opinions are reminiscent of the pre-Bolling opinions that assumed (for
argument) the existence of a fifth amendment equal protection guarantee, and cited
fourteenth amendment decisions to show that no such guarantee was violated. See text
accompanying notes 12-25 supra.
85. In his dissent in Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 431 (1974), Justice
Marshall even spoke of the need for strict scrutiny under "the Equal Protection Clause."
Id. at 431.
86. E.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (quoting Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964), in turn quoting Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954)).
87. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
88. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
89. 404 U.S. at 81. Justice Marshall, dissenting, commented that he would use
"essentially the same approach" in deciding equal protection questions under either
amendment. Id. at 90 n.4.
90. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
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eral statute denying certain veterans' benefits to conscientious objectors
who perform alternative service. After setting out the ubiquitous foot-
note quoted above,9 the Court added: "Thus, if a classification would
be invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it is also inconsistent with the due process requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. See Richardson v. Belcher .. . 9
What does it mean to say that the basic rule of fifth amendment
equal protection is one of congruence with the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment? It means, as the Court said in Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld,13 that the Court's "approach" to the two types
of claims is "precisely the same."94  The critical question in modem
equal protection cases is the standard of review: "strict scrutiny,"
"rational basis," or something in between.95 What the Court sought
to do in the sex discrimination cases and the illegitimacy cases was to
develop coherent doctrinal analyses that would provide standards of
review for both fifth and fourteenth amendment decisions.
Part of the problem of the standard of review is the determination
whether a particular law does or does not amount to racial discrimina-
tion, or discrimination based on sex, or the like. In making that deter-
mination, the same considerations are relevant whether the case arises
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment or the
fifth amendment's equal protection guarantee. Thus it was proper for
the Court in Washington v. Davis96 to seek guidance from the whole
range of decisions on the relevance of legislative motive and racially
discriminatory impact, including fourteenth amendment decisions, in
arriving at its conclusion in a fifth amendment case.97 And it was
proper in Geduldig v. Aiello,9 where a state law was challenged under
91. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
92. 415 U.S. at 364 n.4. A similar congruence is to be found in the application of
the doctrine of "irrebuttable presumptions." Fifth amendment limitations on the federal
government have been treated in exactly the same manner as fourteenth amendment
limitations on the states. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agr. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508
(1974), and Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), both fifth amendment decisions
looking primarily to fourteenth amendment precedents. The doctrine of irrebuttable
presumptions purports to derive from procedural due process, but as Justice Powell
convincingly showed in his concurring opinion in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 651 (1974), the doctrine is a variety of equal protection in masquerade.
93. 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
94. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam) (equal
protection "analysis" the same under both amendments).
95. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
96. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
97. A similar analysis is contained in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
98. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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the equal protection clause as an unconstitutional sex discrimination,
to examine both fifth and fourteenth amendment precedents." What-
ever one may think of the Court's conclusions in those two cases, 00
its "approach" to both decisions was sound in following the basic rule
of congruence of fifth and fourteenth amendment equal protection.
III. THE "OVERRIDING NATIONAL INTERESTS" EXCEPTION
In the Hampton opinion, the Supreme Court said that the presence
of "overriding national interests" might justify federal legislation even
though a similar state law would fail the test of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 0' This language bears a stylistic resemblance to the "com-
pelling state interest" formula, used when the fifth or fourteenth
amendment demands strict scrutiny of a legislative classification. But
Hampton itself strongly indicates that a congressional statute forbidding
the employment of aliens in the federal service would be subjected only
to minimal judicial scrutiny despite the fact that a similar state law
would be invalid absent a showing of a compelling state interest. 10 2
The "overriding national interests" formula, then, seems designed to
permit a narrow category of fifth amendment equal protection cases to
be decided under a rational basis standard, even though a parallel state
law would have to pass the test of strict scrutiny. While the Court in
Hampton did not seek to spell out what it meant by "overriding national
interests," two very narrow classes of exceptions to the basic rule of
fifth and fourteenth amendment congruence are identifiable. In one
group of cases, the national interests that "override" the rule of con-
gruence derive from federalism, and in the other, they derive from the
separation of powers at the level of the national government.
A. The Federalism Exception
When a fifth amendment equal protection issue is closely bound
up with an issue of federalism, it may be appropriate to use a more
99. The key citations were to Frontiero v. Richardson, 421 U.S. 677 (1973), and
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
100. What I think is that they were both wrongly decided. I have spelled out my
position on the problem of Washington v. Davis in my article, Not One Law at Rome
and Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972
WAsH. U.L.Q. 383.
101. See text accompanying note 6 supra for quotation from this opinion.
102. In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), the Court left open the




relaxed standard of review than would be proper in testing a state law
against the demands of the fourteenth amendment. Just such a prob-
lem divided the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson,1'0 3 one of the Warren
Court's most celebrated encounters with equal protection theory.
In Shapiro, two states and the District of Columbia had limited
welfare benefits to persons who had been state (or District) residents
for a year; the Court held all three statutes invalid on equal protection
grounds, making no distinction between the demands of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. The statutes must be subjected to strict scru-
tiny, the Court said, because they inhibited the exercise of the constitu-
tional right to travel interstate. In dissent, Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Black argued that Congress had authorized the states to impose
their residence requirements. 04 The majority responded by denying
that Congress had prescribed a one-year waiting period for the states,
but said that even if it had done so, "Congress may not authorize the
States to violate the Equal Protection Clause."'1
That truism, like most truisms, is unassailable as logic but unhelp-
ful in resolving problems. The conclusion that the state laws in Shapiro
violated the equal protection clause rested on the assumption that they
must pass the test of strict scrutiny. 10 This exacting standard of review
was said to be appropriate because the state laws burdened the exercise
of the constitutional right to travel interstate. But the right to travel
is based in part on the commerce clause's allocation of powers in the
federal system; to this extent, it is obviously not a limitation on Con-
gress but a source of congressional power. In this federalistic dimen-
sion, then, there is no reason why the right to travel should trigger strict
scrutiny of an act of Congress.
This is not to say that the result in Shapiro was wrong, or even
that the Court's truism was inapt. If the right to travel interstate is
one of the rights of equal national citizenship included by the fifth
amendment's guarantee of equal protection,' 0 7 the Court's remark is
perfectly appropriate. Alternatively, if the "fundamental" interest in
Shapiro was the interest in minimum subsistence-something the Court
103. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
104. Id. at 644, 647-54.
105. Id. at 641.
106. The majority did say also that the one-year residence requirements lacked any
rational basis, id. at 638, but that statement is hard to swallow, given the arguments of
administrative convenience and budgetary control made by the states.
107. Cf. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (protecting this right of
national citizenship against state interference).
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later disavowed' 0 -then strict scrutiny would be the proper standard
of review no matter what Congress might authorize. But the Court
was not prepared to pursue either of these lines of analysis.
Perhaps the Shapiro majority was so persuaded of its interpreta-
tion of the federal statute that it thought extended discussion of the
issue of congressional power unnecessary. In any case, the Court's off-
hand treatment of what it took to be a non-issue should not be regarded
as its last word on the subject. In a fifth amendment equal protection
case, the basic rule of congruence with the fourteenth amendment does
not require strict scrutiny of a federal statute when the interest at stake
is one that derives from federalistic limits on the states. 100
B. The Separation-of-Powers Exception
The Hampton case itself required the Court to identify a class of
national interests that might be "overriding," justifying a departure
from the basic rule of congruence of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees of equal protection. This excepted class of cases ap-
pears to be extremely narrow. Indeed, it may extend no further than
the regulation of aliens by the federal government.," It is clear, for
example, that the excepted class does not include the full range of areas
of exclusive federal legislative power. The operation of the military
services, for example, has been subjected to fifth amendment equal
protection limitations that are congruent with those of the fourteenth
amendment."' And even the World War II restrictions on persons of
Japanese ancestry were subjected to the test of strict scrutiny-or so
the Court assured us." 2 This excepted category does not even extend
to the entire reach of congressional power over persons who have come
from foreign countries, since Schneider v. Rusk"a-the routine citation
in decisions following the rule of fifth and fourteenth amendment con-
108. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970).
109. See generally Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975).
110. It would not be the first time a doctrine was invented for application in only
one factual context. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (federal taxpayers have
standing to challenge federal spending that violates the establishment clause).
111. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
112. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
113. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
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gruence-invalidated a federal law providing for the denaturalization
of a naturalized citizen who lived abroad for three years.
This second branch of the "overriding national interests" category
derives not so much from the relative importance of federal and state
interests in the regulated subject matter 1 4 as from the relationship be-
tween Congress and the federal judiciary. It is a relative of the "politi-
cal question" doctrine, arising out of the Court's view that the regula-
tion of aliens is an aspect of the nation's foreign relations, chiefly de-
manding discretion rather than principle in the resolution of issues.
The point found its fullest expression in the Court's unanimous opinion
in a case decided on the same day as Hampton:
[T]he responsibility for regulating the relationship between the
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the
political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in
these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and
since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light
of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions
are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legis-
lature or the Executive than to the Judiciary. . . The reasons
that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a
narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or
the President in the area of immigration and naturalization." 5
It is worth noting that the Court did not say that such decisions
are unreviewable, or that they must be accepted by the courts without
question, as courts accept State Department recognition of foreign
governments. Instead, this exception to the rule of congruence merely
limits the courts to using a rational basis standard when they review
the decisions of the political branches of the federal government. The
difference would not be significant if the rational basis standard used
here were the equivalent of that used to test, say, the power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce. But the Court has shown that
it is capable of giving "rational basis" a bite, above all in the equal pro-
tection area." 6  We should not assume that the Court, in the name
of deference to the political branches, will be as permissive in the con-
text of equal protection as it is in the context of the allocation of powers
114. This factor, of course, is present in cases dealing with the regulation of aliens.
Some state regulations have been held invalid partly or the ground of the federal
government's power to control immigration. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
115. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (footnotes omitted). See also the
reference to the political question doctrine in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
101 n.21, 124-27 (1976).
116. See Gunther, supra note 95, at 18-20.
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between Congress and the states. A federal system of "Big Brother"
surveillance of aliens, for example, would seem vulnerable on fifth
amendment equal protection grounds, even though some conceivable
basis for it were arguable.'
The very narrowness of the two identifiable "overriding national
interests" exceptions gives emphasis to the basic congruence between
the equal protection guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. It is no accident that this rule of congruence came into clear
relief during the same time when the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
were being :-lcorporated into the fourteenth amendment and applied
to the states. Both developments are part of a larger phenomenon, the
expansion of our concept of the rights of national citizenship.
118
The fifth amendment's guarantee of equal protection began as a
throw-away line, a casual remark that such a right might exist, uttered
when the Court had no intention of vindicating it. Remarks of that
kind, however, have a way of being taken seriously as promises-and
we are all the beneficiaries. Much of the growth of our constitutional
liberty has resulted when the downtrodden and the disadvantaged have
called the rest of us to account, insisting that we live up to our stated
principles. Looking back, we can see the development of fifth amend-
ment equal protection as an indispensable ingredient in the growth of
nationhood. By recognizing the claims of equal national citizenship,
we have fostered the idea of a national community. In a diverse and
volatile society, that is no trifling goal.
117. Cf. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976) (fourth
amendment probably bars Immigration and Naturalization Service from systematically
entering and searching dwellings, and stopping and interrogating persons of Mexican
descent).
118. See note 59 supra.
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